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A
SIA’S MOST LETHAL ARMED CONFLICT IN RECENT years
is being waged largely unnoticed in the mountainous
Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, between the royalist govern-
ment and Maoist insurgents. Since 1996, more than 8,700
people have died in the armed conflict, and more than 1,700 people
have been killed since the collapse of peace talks in August 2003. 
Nepal’s increasingly deadly war offers several lessons for the
international community. First, and perhaps most importantly, a
counter insurgency campaign that ignores fundamental human rights
can quickly cause a minor revolt to snowball into a full-scale civil war.
Second, the conflict in Nepal shows that international efforts to erad-
icate terrorism should not come at the expense of bringing past or
present abusers of human rights to justice. Third, the imminent threat
of social chaos brought about by the escalating civil war compels the
active involvement of the international community in efforts to forge
both peace and a more equitable social order in Nepal.
This article is a broad exposition, from a policy perspective, of
Nepal’s precarious democratic transition and the government’s efforts
to wage a counter-insurgency campaign against the Maoists. It seeks
to promote an open dialogue in the international community regard-
ing the human rights challenges facing Nepal by articulating the com-
plex political and social context in which the promotion, protection,
and enforcement of basic human rights principles takes place.
1990-2003: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TURMOIL UNDER A
CONSTITUTIONAL FAÇADE
A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS since
1990 underscores the role of human rights abuses in fueling the pres-
ent armed conflict in Nepal. Democracy protests rocked Kathmandu
in April 1990 as part of a “people’s movement” calling on Nepal’s
monarch to establish a constitutional monarchy, dismiss the cabinet,
and dissolve the panchayat, which is a partyless system of government
rule where local council and district representatives elect the members
of the national legislature. The protests did not abate even though
security service officials opened fire on the demonstrators. The rising
tempo and intensity of the protests forced King Birendra to make
sweeping democratic reforms, including drafting a new constitution.
The palace preserved a substantial amount of power in the new con-
stitution, however, by excluding a vast portion of the body politic
from the drafting process. Caught off-balance by the speed of these
developments, the leaders of the democracy movement were unable
develop ways to codify democratic practices in the new constitution. 
By November 1990, the contours of Nepal’s new constitution
emerged, but the cloud of backroom deals hung heavily over the
process. Much of the constitution was a gentleman’s agreement
between King Birendra, the Congress Party, and a broad coalition of
Communist groups. Some key aspects of the new constitution, includ-
ing the control of the armed forces and the king’s powers to intervene
in periods of emergency, remained disturbingly ill-defined. Under the
new constitution, the king remains the commander in chief of the
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). This was the result of the RNA’s peti-
tion to the palace during the drafting process to maintain the king as
its commander in chief. Further, article 127, entitled, “Power to
Remove Difficulties,” provides that “[i]f any difficulty arises in con-
nection with the implementation of this Constitution, His Majesty
may issue necessary orders to remove such difficulty and such orders
shall be laid before parliament.” The king has often invoked this clause
to justify action that most observers have regarded as extra-constitu-
tional. This uncertain distribution of power made it unclear whether
the constitution established a genuine multi-party democracy with the
monarch as a figurehead, or whether it maintained a strong monarchy
dominating a weak parliamentary system. 
Nepal’s fledgling democracy walked with shaky legs on precari-
ous grounds. The new constitutional leadership did not attempt to
reform or transform the security services, which historically served to
enforce autocratic rule. There was no credible effort to account for the
many human rights violations committed during the earlier panchay-
at regime, which ranged from the armed suppression of peaceful
protests to extra-legal acts of political violence such as the abduction,
indefinite detention, and murder of political opponents. Aware of the
RNA’s continuing loyalty to the king, the political parties appeared
content not to make too many waves during this transition period. 
Unfortunately, the failure to bring past violators of human rights
to justice fostered a broad sense of impunity. The new constitutional
order failed to develop a judicial mechanism to hold the military, police,
and the palace accountable for human rights violations prior to 1990.
The newly ascendant political parties appeared willing to overlook cor-
ruption and political intimidation as long as they benefited from the
new constitutional order. Instead of revolutionary change or genuine
democracy, many Nepalese saw a system in which the new political elite
simply cut themselves a large piece of the social and political pie. 
High expectations for the new constitutional order quickly evap-
orated as the political system was whipsawed by a long sequence of no-
confidence votes, change in governments, supreme court disputes,
internal party leadership battles, and opportunistic coalition-hopping.
Since 1990, Nepal has seen fourteen governments–hardly a recipe for
social progress or building institutional confidence.
Amidst this revolving turnstile of coalitions mostly involving the
dominant Congress Party and various smaller parties, the Maoists
were only one of Nepal’s many feuding far-left factions. But violent
efforts directed by the Congress Party leadership to suppress leftist
political activity galvanized both the Maoists and a rising tide of local-
ized resentment against the government. In 1995, the congress-led
government launched “Operation Romeo” in order to round up left-
ist groups accused of committing unspecified acts of terrorism. Under
the direction of local party leaders, police forces conducted a broad
sweep of several villages, arresting individuals without warrants and
subjecting them to torture. Nearly 6,000 residents were driven out of
their villages, and more than 130 people were arrested without war-
rants. These heavy-handed police operations provided vital momen-
tum for the insurgency movement.
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During the course of Operation Romeo, Maoist leaders publicly
embraced violence as their modus operandi, although they probably
adopted their doctrine of revolution through “people’s war” as early as
1992. The Maoists’ anti-imperialist, anti-monarchy, and anti-feudalist
rhetoric appealed to the lower castes and rural families that felt long-
neglected by the Kathmandu elite. Their arguments assailing corrup-
tion and political deadlock resonated with many Nepalese, and their
strong ideological stance stood in stark contrast to the constant com-
promise of values that seemed rife within the parliamentary system.
But few Nepalese knew or cared about Communist theory. Their sup-
port of the insurgency reflected instead their disillusionment with an
unresponsive and exploitative government. 
Despite their popular appeal, the Maoists were poorly positioned
to conduct an armed conflict against the government. Most accounts
suggest that the Maoists began their armed struggle with only a hand-
ful of dilapidated rifles. They began attacking government facilities in
February 1996 after a period of government unresponsiveness to their
demands. Rebel and government forces have since then engaged in an
ever-intensifying cycle of attacks and reprisals. Hopes for a peaceful
return to social order took a turn for the worse in June 2001 when
Crown Prince Dipendra massacred ten members of the royal fami-
ly–including the king, queen and his brother–before taking his own
life.
After a round of peace talks between the Maoist rebels and the
government collapsed in 2001, the armed conflict steadily increased
in its lethality. After pulling out of the peace talks in November 2001,
the rebels launched high profile, well-coordinated attacks against mil-
itary, police, and government facilities across the country. Feeling
personally betrayed by the rebels’ unilateral withdrawal from the
talks, Prime Minister Deuba declared a state of emergency and for the
first time ordered the RNA to quash the insurgency. The RNA had
resisted earlier pleas by political leaders to play a role in the conflict,
insisting that it could not act until the government declared a state of
emergency. Although the military had long been confident that it
could easily break the insurgency when the chance arose, the task
proved far more difficult and casualties escalated beyond expecta-
tions. By most reasonable measures, Nepal had a full-blown, armed
internal conflict at this point. 
In May 2002, largely due to continued squabbling within his
Congress Party, Prime Minister Deuba asked the new King Gyanendra
to dissolve the lower house of parliament and call for new elections,
which were slated for November 13. Prime Minister Deuba also dis-
solved locally elected bodies and replaced them with appointed offi-
cials to curb Maoist control of local government offices. When the
Maoists declared that they would mobilize a national strike against the
parliamentary elections, Deuba requested the ballot be put off for a
year due to security concerns. On October 4, King Gyanendra, assail-
ing the incompetence of the political parties, dismissed Deuba’s gov-
ernment and assumed executive powers. He appointed a former pre-
mier, Lokendra Chand, as Prime Minister. Since the king’s assumption
of power, Nepal has sailed in uncharted constitutional waters, and
daily government operations are now far removed from any design
originally imagined during the drafting of the 1990 Constitution.
According to most insiders, King Gyanendra hoped to quickly
strike a peace deal with the Maoists and undertake a series of sweep-
ing government reforms before returning the reigns of power to elect-
ed officials. Hopes among the public ran high with the January 2003
announcement of a ceasefire and subsequent peace talks. But progress
at the peace table quickly eroded. Political parties became increasing-
ly frustrated by the marginal role they played during the negotiation
process; and both Maoists and government forces became increasing-
ly suspicious of each other, violating the code of conduct set up to gov-
ern their behavior during the ceasefire. 
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Residents of Kathmandu are concerned about the success of a 
democratic transition in the midst of a counter-insurgency campaign.
“This uncertain distribution of
power made it unclear whether
the constitution established a
genuine multi-party
democracy with the monarch
as a figurehead, or whether it
maintained a strong monarchy
dominating a weak
parliamentary system.” 
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THE PRESENT SITUATION
THE MAOISTS AND THE ROYAL NEPALESE ARMY continue to com-
mit human rights abuses on a widespread basis, and there is virtually
no political or legal recourse for the victims of such abuses. In August
2003, as the third round of peace talks were about to begin in western
Nepal, government troops detained at least twenty Maoist suspects in
the eastern village of Doramba. The troops led these individuals out of
the village and killed them in what one diplomat described as “cold-
blooded executions.” As this incident shows, government forces cur-
rently enjoy unfettered discretion to take any course of action they
deem necessary to suppress the Maoist insurgency. A leading human
rights organization notes that government secu-
rity forces have been linked to more than 250
disappearances and "hundreds of alleged extra-
judicial executions, thousands of arbitrary
arrests and numerous reports of torture."
Maoist rebels have been equal in their dis-
regard of basic human rights and humanitarian
law principles. Across Nepal, Maoist rebels
practice extortion; they regularly target teachers,
local politicians, and military figures for high
profile and often-gruesome demonstration
killings; and they use homemade explosive
devices that often result in civilian casualties.
There is also credible evidence that Maoist
forces forcefully recruit adults and children into
their units. As such, most rural Nepalese find
themselves caught between Maoist and royalist
military forces willing to use indiscriminate
force against them.
Maoist and government forces have adopt-
ed new battlefield strategies as the war has
resumed. The Maoists have moved away from
mass attacks on district police and army head-
quarters and have instead used small cells to
carry out a steady assassination campaign across the nation, including
the capital city of Kathmandu. Army, police, and political party offi-
cials, particularly party members who are seen as close to the palace,
are the most common targets. The Maoists have also expanded their
activities in eastern Nepal and the Terai (the flatlands that border
India), areas that were spared the worst fighting earlier in the conflict.
For its part, the Royal Nepalese Army, having significantly upgraded
its firepower and improved base defenses during the ceasefire, has
claimed a number of successful offensives. It is difficult to assess the
extent of battlefield losses on both sides, but the truth is that most of
those killed in Nepal are civilians.
CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS
THE DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NEPAL
WITH THE MAOISTS AND THE ROYAL NEPALESE ARMY deter-
mined to use battlefield gains to secure leverage for future talks, the
chances that the conflict will end quickly are bleak. The deteriorating
situation in Nepal has proved a quandary for the international com-
munity, particularly among the main players. The United States,
India, and the United Kingdom have provided Nepal with substantial
military aid in an effort to fight the Maoist insurgents. One local ana-
lyst explains that this international aid constitutes “an alliance of con-
venience and self interest; all have specific reasons why further
upheaval in Nepal is not in their long-term interests.”
These countries approach the conflict from different angles.
The United States casts the conflict in Nepal as another front in the
war on terror. India and the United Kingdom are increasingly frus-
trated by the king’s unwillingness to embrace the mainstream politi-
cal parties and establish an all-party government–a reasonable com-
promise given the difficulty of holding elections, but not a permanent
solution in light of the increasing frequency and
intensity of ongoing street protests organized by
political parties opposing what they call a “royal
regression.”
Despite mounting international pressure
on the palace and the political parties to work
together, King Gyanendra is reluctant to install a
genuine, all-party government or fully restore the
democratic process. Speculation concerning a
possible change of prime minister is an almost
daily occurrence. Current Prime Minister Surya
Bahadur Thapa continues to stress the impor-
tance of restoring democracy, but this commit-
ment has not gone beyond rhetoric.
A number of proposals to restore democra-
cy, such as increasing the representation of tra-
ditionally disenfranchised groups, have been
placed on the government’s agenda. But the real-
ity is that the Nepalese political system faces for-
midable challenges, and much remains to be
done at the groundwork level, such as improv-
ing negotiation processes and developing effec-
tive implementation mechanisms for a future
peace deal. Ultimately, however, the prospects
for a lasting solution to the present conflict will remain an illusion
until a genuine, democratic multi-party government is established
that can fully participate in the peace process.
In many respects, the best option to address these challenges
would be the establishment of low-key, behind-the-scenes interna-
tional mediation mechanisms that offer a structured, well-managed
setting in which the palace, the political parties, and the Maoists could
discuss the country’s fate. But this currently is not a viable option
because the Indian government remains adamantly opposed to outside
mediation in a part of the world they view as within their strategic
sphere, and the international community has been unwilling to con-
vince India otherwise.
The international community must present Nepal with a com-
mon stance: the king should reinstate an all-party government; the
parties should stop their perpetual infighting; and the Maoist insur-
gents should return to the peace table. Dialogue in the international
community is necessary because all the parties involved in Nepal’s con-
flict lack the political courage to halt the country’s accelerating descent
into senseless violence.  HRB
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King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah.
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